The new perspectives on Bayesian model criticisms presented in Ratmann et al. (2009) are challenging standard approaches to Bayesian model choice. We discuss here some issues arising from the approach, including prior influence, model assessment and criticism, and the meaning of error.
In Ratmann et al. (2009) , the perception of the approximation error in the ABC algorithm (Pritchard et al., 1999 , Beaumont et al., 2002 , Marjoram et al., 2003 is radically modified, moving from a computational parameter that is calibrated by the user when balancing precision and computing time into a genuine parameter about which inferences can be made in the same manner as for the original parameter θ. As stressed in Section S2 of Ratmann et al. (2009) , this is indeed a change of perception rather than a modification of the ABC method in that the target in θ remains the same. (This should not be construed as a criticism in that the unification of most ABC representations proposed in Section 2 is immensely valuable.) Although the derivation of the distribution ξ x 0 ,θ ( ) is somewhat convoluted in Section S1, we note here that it is simply the distribution of the error ρ(S(x), S(x 0 )) when x ∼ f (x|θ), i.e. a projection of f (x|θ) in probabilistic terms.
Example-For a Poisson x 0 ∼ P(θ) model, a natural divergence is the difference = x − x 0 which is distributed as a translated Poisson P(θ) − x 0 when conditional on x 0 and which is marginaly distributed as the difference of two iid P(θ) variables. Since thus is an integer valued variable, the supplementary prior π should reflect this feature. A natural solution is
since the series k 1/k 2 is converging, even though using a proper prior π does not appear to be a necessary condition in Ratmann et al. (2009) .
The change of perception in Ratmann et al. (2009) is based on the underlying assumption that the data is informative about the error term , which is not necessarily the case, as shown by the previous and following examples.
Example-For a location family, x 0 ∼ f (x − θ), if we take = x − x 0 , the posterior distribution of is
and therefore a mostly flat prior π θ (θ) with a large support produces a posterior π ( |x 0 ) identical to π ( ) for most values of x 0 . Conversely, a highly concentrated prior π ( ) hardly modifies the posterior π(θ|x 0 ).
Example-For the binomial model x 0 ∼ B(n, θ), assuming a uniform prior θ ∼ U(0, 1), we can consider = x − x 0 , in which case is supported on {−n, . . . , n}. If we use a uniform prior on as well, 
Bayesian model assessment
The paper chooses to assess the validity of the model based on the marginal likelihood m(x) instead of the predictive p(x|x 0 ). While this has the advantage of "using the data once", it suffers from a strong impact of the prior modelling and of not conditioning on the observed data x 0 . A more appropriate (if still ad-hoc) procedure is to relate the observed statistics S(x 0 ) with statistics simulated from p(x|x 0 ), as in, e.g., Verdinelli and Wasserman (1998) . It may be argued that checking the prior adequacy is a good thing, but having no way to distinguish between prior and sampling model inadequacy is a difficulty, as seen in the Poisson example.
Example-For the location family, x 0 ∼ f (x − θ), the joint posterior distribution of (θ, ) is
and therefore the difference ( − θ) is not identifiable from the data, solely from the prior(s).
Note that, from an ABC perspective, using p(x|x 0 ) instead of m(x) does not imply a considerable increase in computing time. However, computing the Bayes factor (and therefore the evidence) using the acceptance rate of the ABC algorithm is even faster. Moreover, it provides a different answer.
Example-For the Poisson P(θ) model, if we take as an example an exponential E(1) prior π θ , the evidence associated with the model is
while the quantitative assessment of Ratmann et al. (2009) is
with
The numerical comparison of both functions of x 0 in Figure 1 shows a much slower decrease in x 0 for the p-value (1) than for the evidence, not to mention a frankly puzzling non-monotonicity of the p-value.
Implications of model criticism
While the approach by Ratmann et al. (2009) provides an informal assessment that can be derived in an ABC setting, the Bayesian foundations of the method may be questioned. The core of the Bayesian approach is to incorporate all aspects of uncertainty and all aspects of decision consequences into a single inferential machine that provides the "optimal" solution. In the current case, while the consequences of rejecting the current model are not discussed, they would most likely include the construction of another model. In the first graph in the paper, several models are contrasted and this leads us to wonder about the gain compared with using the Bayes factor, which can be directly derived from the ABC simulation as well since the (accepted or rejected) proposed values are simulated from π(θ)f (x|θ).
Example-For the Poisson x 0 ∼ P(θ) model, running ABC with no approximation (since this is a finite setting) produces an exact evaluation of the evidence.
We also note that the non-parametric evaluation at the basis of the ABC µ algorithm of Ratmann et al. (2009) can equally be used for approximating the true marginal density m(x). The smooth version of ABC µ presented in Section S1.5, eqn. [S8], is however far from being a density estimate of ξ x 0 ,θ ( ) since it based on a single realisation from f (x|θ). It should rather be construed as a (further) smoothed version of its smooth ABC counterpart and this suggests integreting over h as well. Unless some group structure can be exploited to avoid the repetition of simulations x b = x b (θ), the nonparametric estimator [S9] cannot be used as a practical device because either B is small, in which case the non-parametric approximation is poor, or B is large, in which case producing the x b 's for every value of θ is too timeconsuming. Obviously, using moderate B is always feasible from a computational point of view and it can also be argued that the approximation of f ρ (θ, |x 0 ) byf ρ (θ, |x 0 ) is not of major interest, since the former is only an approximation to the true target. (In a vaguely connected way, the rejection sampler of Subsection S1.8 does seem an approximation to exact rejectionsampling, in that the choice of the upper bound C = max i min kξk ( ik , x i ) over the samples simulated in Step 1 of the algorithm does not produce a true upper bound.)
On the meaning of the error
The error term is defined as part of the model, based on the marginal, with the additional input of a prior distribution π( ). Since Ratmann et al. (2009) analyse this error based on the product of two densities, ξ x 0 ,θ ( )π( ), this product is not properly defined from a probabilistic point of view. The authors choose to call ξ x 0 ,θ ( ) a "likelihood" by a fiducial argument, but this is (strictly speaking) not [proportional to] a density in x 0 . Obviously, simulating from the density that is proportional to ξ x 0 ,θ ( )π( )π(θ) is entirely possible as long as this function integrates in (θ, ) against the dominating measure, but it suffers from an undefined probabilistic background in that, for instance, it is not invariant under reparameterisation in : changing to ε introduces the squared Jacobian |d /dε| 2 in the "density". We acknowledge that most ABC strategies can be seen as using a formal "prior+likelihood" representation of the distribution of , since
but this formal perspective does not turn into a "true" parameter and π into its prior. For instance, non parametric π 's may be based on the observations or on additional simulations.
The denomination of "likelihood" is thus debatable in that ξ x 0 ,θ ( )π( )π(θ) cannot always be turned into a density on x 0 (or even on a statistic S(x 0 )).
Example-For the Poisson x 0 ∼ P(θ) model, ξ x 0 ,θ ( ) is the translated Poisson distribution P(θ) − , truncated to positive values. While this is indeed a distribution on x 0 , conditional on (θ, ), it cannot be used as the original Poisson distribution, because of the unidentifiability of .
We also think that comparing models via the ("posterior") distributions of the errors does not provide a coherent setup in that this approach does not incorporate the model complexity penalisation that is at the heart of the Bayesian model comparison tools like the Bayes factor. First, a more complex (e.g., with more parameters) model will most likely have a more dispersed distribution on . Second, returning to the first argument of that nore, the choice of the prior π( ) (and of the error itself) is model dependent (as stressed in the paper via the notation π( , M )) and the comparison thus reflects possibly mostly the prior modelling instead of the data assessment, as shown, again, by the location parameter example. Using the same band of rejection for all models as in Figure 1 of Ratmann et al. (2009) thus does not seem possible nor recommendable on a general basis.
